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California Practicum
The California Practicum is a series of articles dealing with subjects of signif.
icance to California attorneys. The purpose of the Practicum is to inform the
reader of practical problems on the cutting edge of California law in both the
state and federal forums, and to act as an initial resource for resolving those
problems.
The Overruling of Royal Globe: A "Royal Bonanza"
for Insurance Companies, But What Happens
Now?t
I. INTRODUCTION
Now that Royal Globe Insurance Co. v. Superior Court' has been
overruled by the California Supreme Court in Moradi-Shalal v. Fire-
man's Fund Insurance Cos.,2 the inevitable question is: "What hap-
pens now?" Several writers have offered their opinions as to the
effect of Moradi-Shalal,3 but it has become abundantly clear that, in
general, people are not familiar with the status of the law regarding
unfair and abusive insurance claims practices. 4
t Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Insurance Cos., 46 Cal. 3d 287, 313-14, 758 P.2d 58,
75, 250 Cal. Rptr. 116, 133 (1988) (Mosk, J., dissenting) ("The majority have now
replaced Royal Globe with a "Royal Bonanza" for insurance carriers.").
1. 23 Cal. 3d 880, 592 P.2d 329, 153 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1979), rev'd, 46 Cal. 3d 287, 785
P.2d 58, 250 Cal. Rptr. 116 (1988).
2. 46 Cal. 3d 287, 758 P.2d 58, 250 Cal. Rptr. 116 (1988).
3. Bourhis, Practical Concerns For Civil Litigators in Light of Moradi-Shalal, 18
CTLA F. 365 (1988); Thomas, Black Friday-Third Party Remedies Against Insurers
After Moradi-Shalal and Blough, 18 CTLA F. 359 (1988); Hahn, Insurance Chief
Should Answer to Voters, L.A. Times, Sept. 22, 1988, § 2 (Metro), at 7, col. 3; Insurance
Revolution, L.A. Times, Aug. 26, 1988, § 2, (Metro), at 6, col. 1; Boles, Private Bad-
Faith Suit Against Insurer Abolished by California Supreme Court, L.A. Daily J., Aug.
22, 1988, at 1, col. 1; Hager, Suits Against 'Bad Faith'Insurers Barred by Justices, L.A.
Times, Aug. 19, 1988, § 1, at 1, col. 1; Insurers Win Ban On 'Bad Faith'Lawsuits, L.A.
Times, Aug. 18, 1988, § 1, at 1, col. 5.
4. Los Angeles City Attorney James Hahn stated that under Moradi-Shalal, "a
policy holder's only remedy is to inform the California Department of Insurance that
an insurance company has wrongfully refused to pay a claim and then hope that the
department will take action against the company." Hahn, Insurance Chief Should An-
swer to Voters, L.A. Times, Sept. 22, 1988, § 2 (Metro) at 7, col. 3 (emphasis added).
This is simply not true. Although Hahn mentions a remedy, it is certainly not the only
remedy. See infra notes 185-88, 195-211, and accompanying text.
The law regarding unfair and abusive insurance claims practices
has developed as the tort of "bad faith," or breach of the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing.S Although independent tort actions are
available for handling abusive insurance claims practices, 6 this article
will focus on insurance bad faith. Section I will discuss the historical
development of insurance bad faith in California, including both the
common law and statutory regulations which existed prior to Royal
Globe. A foundation will be established using the principle cases in-
volving insurance bad faith. The relevant rulings and facts will be
set forth to give the reader an understanding of how this area of the
law has evolved, as well as the types of abuses the California courts
are trying to prevent.
Section II will discuss the effect Royal Globe had on the develop-
ment of insurance bad faith law, while section III will discuss the
Moradi-Shalal decision and its impact. Finally, the author concludes
that insureds still have bad faith actions against their insurance com-
panies. However, absent assignment of a bad faith claim by an in-
sured, a third-party victim will have to rely on traditional tort
theories or future legislative intervention to recover damages for un-
fair and abusive insurance claims practices.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF INSURANCE BAD FAITH
LIABILITY IN CALIFORNIA
The tort of bad faith is a judicially created form of extra-contrac-
tual liability7 which emerged as early as 1899,8 but did not become
fully established until 1931.9 Historically, breach of contract was the
primary cause of action available for broken promises10 and, there-
5. See S. ASHLEY, BAD FAITH LIABILITY, A STATE-BY-STATE REVIEW §§ 1:05, 2:01-
02 (1987) [hereinafter ASHLEY]; J. MCCARTHY, PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN BAD FAITH
CASES § 1.7 (4th ed. 1987) [hereinafter MCCARTHY].
6. See, e.g., G. KORNBLUM, M. KAUFMAN, H. LEVINE, CALIFORNIA PRACTICE
GUIDE, BAD FAITH 3:3-5 (1988) [hereinafter KORNBLUM].
7. KORNBLUM, supra note 6, at 1:2. Extra-contractual liability refers to the tort
liability for compensatory and punitive damages recoverable over and above that
which is required under the express terms of the contract. Id. at 1:4.
8. ASHLEY, supra note 5, § 1:02, at 6 (citing Rumford Falls Paper Co. v. Fidelity &
Casualty Co., 92 Me. 574, 43 A. 503 (1899)). Although the Maine Supreme Court re-
jected plaintiffs' argument that they were entitled to indemnification for an excess
judgment in an insurance dispute, Ashley notes that this is "the earliest reported case
of what we now think of as insurer bad faith .... Id.
9. I& § 2:01, at 55 (citing Hilker v. Western Auto. Ins. Co., 204 Wis. 1, 231 N.W.
257 (1930), qff'd on rehg, 204 Wis. 1, 235 N.W. 413 (1931)). The Wisconsin Supreme
Court in Hilker ruled that although the insurer did not have a duty to settle an action
against its insured, it must act in good faith when deciding whether to settle or defend
an action. Hilker, 204 Wis. at 14-15, 231 N.W. at 258-59.
10. ASHLEY, supra note 5, § 1:01. "Parties could first bring an action in assumpsit
for breach of a promise given in exchange for a promise [(contract)] at the beginning of
the 17th century." Id, § 1:01 n.1 (citing T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE
COMMON LAW 643-46 (5th ed. 1956)).
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fore, only contract damages could be recovered. However, in the mid
1900s, courts began to realize that with only contractual remedies
available, insurers would, at most, be held liable for the policy limits
and could therefore benefit from delaying or refusing settlement of
valid claims." In response to this realization, the courts began to
award .compensatory1 2  and eventually punitive damages' 3  for
breaches of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, or bad faith.14
Although not the "true pioneers," the California courts have been at
the forefront of this modern revolution in both common law and stat-
utory interpretation. 15
11. KORNBLUM, supra note 6, 1:14. See, e.g., Brown v. Guarantee Ins. Co., 155
Cal. App. 2d 679, 682-83, 319 P.2d 69, 71 (1957) (conflict of interest between insurer and
insured when settlements approach policy limits).
12. See, e.g., Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13
(1967); Comunale v. Traders & General Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958);
Brown v. Guarantee Ins. Co., 155 Cal. App. 2d 679, 319 P.2d 69 (1957).
13. See, e.g., Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal.
Rptr. 480 (1973); Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 89 Cal.
Rptr. 78 (1970); Wetherbee v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 265 Cal. App. 2d 921, 71 Cal.
Rptr. 764 (1968).
14. Bad faith is defined as "a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing
implied by law in every contract." KORNBLUM, supra note 6, 1:2 (emphasis in origi-
nal). The breach of this covenant, independent of other tort recoveries, may give rise
to tort liability, and therefore to compensatory as well as punitive damages. Fletcher
v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 401-02, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78, 93-94 (1970).
Further, "'bad faith' . . . [is] not meant to connote the absence or presence of positive
misconduct of a malicious or immoral nature .... Neal v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 21 Cal.
3d 910, 921-22 n.5, 582 P.2d 980, 986 n.5, 148 Cal. Rptr. 389, 395 n.5 (1978). Instead, it is
simply the opposite of "good faith," which "emphasizes faithfulness to an agreed com-
mon purpose and consistency with the justified expectations of the other party ......
Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 231 comment a (tentative draft
Nos. 1-7) (1973)).
15. ASHLEY, supra note 5, § 2:01, at 55. For excellent discussions of pre-Royal
Globe bad faith liability in California, see Allen, Insurance Bad Faith Law: The Need
for Legislative Intervention, 13 PAC. L.J. 833 (1982); Ashley, Guidelines for the Insurer
in Avoiding Bad Faith Exposure, 36 FED'N OF INS. & CORP. COUNS. Q. 103 (1986);
Damlos, The Duty of Good Faith-More Than Just a Duty to Defend and Settle Claims,
14 W. ST. U. L. REV. 209 (1986); Karp, Avoiding Punitive Damages in Property Insur-
ance Cases: Are We Being Intimidated By Windmills?, 36 FED'N OF INS. & CORP.
CoUNs. Q. 369 (1986); Kornblum, Royal Globe v. Superior Court: Its Impact on Litiga-
tion Involving Insurers, 15 FORUM 967 (1980); Levine, Demonstrating and Preserving
the Deterrent Effect of Punitive Damages in Insurance Bad Faith Actions, 13 U.S.F. L.
REV. 613 (1979); Mayhew, Bad Faith and the Uninsured Motorist Claim, 19 FORUM 618
(1984); Rees, Bad Faith and Unfair Claims Handling Review, 36 FED'N OF INS. &
CORP. COUNS. Q. 389 (1986); Tornehl, Insurer's Liability for Wrongful Refusal to
Honor First Party Claims, 29 FED'N OF INS. & CORP. COUNS. Q. 397 (1979); Comment,
Damages for Mental Suffering Caused By Insurers: Recent Developments in the Law
of Tort and Contract, 48 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1303 (1973); Comment, Bad Faith." A
Commentary, 17 U. WEST L.A. L. REV. 1 (1985).
A. Pre-Royal Globe Bad Faith Liability: Case Law
Bad faith was first established in California by the court of appeal
in Brown v. Guarantee Insurance Co.,16 wherein the court held that
the basis of the insured's cause of action should be bad faith rather
than negligence.17 The court concluded that "when an insurer en-
gages in compromise negotiations of a claim against the insured, it
owes the insured a duty to exercise good faith, for the breach of
which it is liable in damages."18 In addition, Brown was the first case
to set out factors to be considered when deciding whether an in-
surer's actions constituted bad faith.19 The court stated:
In deciding whether the insurer's refusal to settle constitutes a breach of its
duty to exercise good faith, the following factors should be considered:
[-] the strength of the insured claimant's case on the issues of liability and
damages;
[-] attempts by the insurer to induce the insured to contribute to a
settlement;
[-] failure of the insurer to properly investigate the circumstances so as to as-
certain the evidence against the insured;
[-] the insurer's rejection of advice of its own attorney or agent;
[-] failure of the insurer to inform the insured of a compromise offer;
[-] the amount of financial risk to which each party is exposed in the event
of a refusal to settle;
[o] the fault of the insured in inducing the insurer's rejection of the compro-
mise offer by misleading it as to the facts; and(-] any other factors tending to establish or negate bad faith on the part of
the insurer.2 0
In Brown, the insured brought an action for damages resulting
from the insurer's alleged bad faith conduct in refusing to settle the
claim, within the policy limits, of an injured party against the in-
sured. In the context of this classic third-party claim,21 the court
16. 155 Cal. App. 2d 679, 319 P.2d 69 (1957).
17. Id. at 688-89, 319 P.2d at 75 ("[We are convinced that only bad faith should be
the basis of the insured's cause of action.").
18. Id. at 682, 319 P.2d at 71.
19. Id. at 689, 319 P.2d at 75.
20. Id. To emphasize the long-standing quality of these bad faith factors, it is in-
teresting to note that 30 years after Brown the following factors are considered when
determining whether the insurer's actions constitute bad faith:
- Failure to investigate claim thoroughly (7 4:58);
- Failure to evaluate claim objectively (7 4:83);
- Unduly restrictive interpretation of policy or claim forms ( 4:95);
- Using improper standards to deny claim ( 4:98);
- Purposeful delay in payment of claim (7 4:107);
- Dilatory claims handling (7 4:102);
- Deceptive practices to avoid payment of claims (Q 4:116);
- Abusive or coercive practices to compel compromise of claim (7 4:120);
- Breakdown in communications with insured ($ 4:134);
- Unreasonable conduct during litigation ( 4:149).
KORNBLUM, supra note 6, 4:57. See also MCCARTHY, supra note 5, §§ 2.28-2.37.
21. "A 'third party case' is one in which the 'bad faith' cause of action is based on
an insurance company's unreasonable handling of or refusal to settle a third party's
claim against the insured under a liability insurance policy." KORNBLUM, supra note
6, 1:8 (emphasis in original). However, it is the insured who has the cause of action for
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held that payment by the insured to the injured party of any verdict
in excess of the policy limits was not a prerequisite to creating liabil-
ity in the insurer for the full amount of the judgment.2 2 Further-
more, the court held that the cause of action against the insurer for
the excess judgment was assignable to the injured party.23
The next case in the development of bad faith liability in Califor-
nia was Comunale v. Trader's & General Insurance Co.24 This case is
best known for the supreme court's reasoning that "[t]here is an im-
plied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in every contract that
neither party will do anything which will injure the right of the
other to receive the benefits of the agreement."25 In addition, the
supreme court stated:
[Trhe implied obligation of good faith and fair dealing requires the insurer to
settle in an appropriate case although the express terms of the policy do not
impose such a duty.
The insurer, in deciding whether a claim should be compromised, must take
into account the interest of the insured and give it at least as much considera-
tion as it does to its own interest.2 6
Therefore, not only is the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing found in every contract, but an insurer may have an affirma-
tive duty to settle in an appropriate case.
Like Brown, Comunale involved an insured who brought an action
for damages because of the insurer's bad faith in refusing to settle a
claim within the policy limits of an injured party against the insured.
These excess judgment cases refined bad faith liability.
In Comunale, the injured third party sued the insured for personal
breach of the implied covenant, usually for excess liability actions, because privity of
contract exists between the insured and the insurer. Damlos, supra note 15, at 224. "A
third party claimant does not have the right to proceed under a contract of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing because there is no privity of contract." I&i at
223 (emphasis added). When a claim is against the insured, it is a third-party claim
and the third party is the allegedly injured party. MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 1.7, at
21. A first-party claim occurs when an insured brings its own claim against the insur-
ance company for mishandling its claim under coverage providing for direct reimburse-
ments. Id.; see also KORNBLUM, supra note 6, at 1:5. Examples of first-party claims
include: life, health, and disability insurance, as well as medical, collision, and unin-
sured motorist coverage under liability insurance coverage. KORNBLUM, supra note 6,
1:6-7. An injured third party may have a first-party claim by becoming an additional
insured under the insured's policy (e.g., permissive driver or occupant), Md at 1:12.1.
22. Brown v. Guarantee Ins. Co., 155 Cal. App. 2d 679, 689-90, 319 P.2d 69, 75-76
(1957).
23. Id. at 693-95, 319 P.2d at 78-79.
24. 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958).
25. Id at 658, 328 P.2d at 200 (citation omitted).
26. Id at 659, 328 P.2d at 200-01 (citing Ivy v. Pacific Auto. Ins. Co., 156 Cal. App.
2d 652, 659, 320 P.2d 140, 146 (1958)).
injuries resulting from an automobile accident. Although the insured
informed his insurer of the pending suit, the insurer refused to de-
fend the action. As a result, the insured was forced to obtain in-
dependent counsel to defend the suit. Subsequently, the third party
offered to settle the case for $16,000 less than the total policy limits. 2 7
The insured could not afford to pay but demanded that the insurer
pay the claim, thereby settling the suit. The insurer, however, re-
fused to pay the settlement amount and, at trial, the third party re-
covered a verdict for $15,000 over the policy limits. 28 In a subsequent
indemnity action brought by the insured against his insurer, the in-
sured recovered the policy limit and then assigned his rights in a bad
faith cause of action to the third party, thus allowing the injured
third party to recover the excess judgment.29
In holding the insurer liable for the amount in excess of the policy
limits, the court established the foundation for future bad faith
liability:
An insurer who denies coverage does so at his own risk, and, although its posi-
tion may not have been entirely groundless, if the denial is found to be wrong-
ful it is liable for the full amount which will compensate the insured....
Certainly an insurer who not only rejected a reasonable offer of settlement
but also wrongfully refused to defend should be in no better position than if it
had assumed the defense and then declined to settle. The insurer should not
be permitted to profit by its own wrong.3 0
The supreme court also noted, in dictum, that breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing sounded in both tort and
contract.3 1
In the 1967 landmark case of Crisci v. Security Insurance Co.,32 the
California Supreme Court relied on the dictum in Comunale to
firmly establish tort liability for insurance bad faith.33 The court
held "that a plaintiff who as a result of a defendant's tortious conduct
loses his property and suffers mental distress may recover not only
for the pecuniary loss but also for his mental distress."34 In reaching
this conclusion, the court restated its earlier reasoning in
27. Id. at 657, 328 P.2d at 200 (The insured was covered under a policy with limits
of $10,000 per person injured and $20,000 per accident. The Comunales had offered to
settle the case for $4,000.).
28. Id. (Mr. Comunale was awarded a verdict of $25,000 while his wife was
awarded $1250.).
29. Id. at 662-63, 328 P.2d at 202.
30. Id. at 660, 328 P.2d at 202.
31. Id. at 663, 328 P.2d at 203.
32. 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967). For additional analysis of
this decision, see Levit, The Crisci Case-Something Old, Something New, 12 INS. L.J.
12 (1968); Note, Insurance-Insurer Liability for Excess Judgment Upon Failure to Ac-
cept Reasonable Settlement Demand in Good Faith; Merits of Absolute Liability Given
Favorable Consideration: Crisci v. Security Insurance Co., 5 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 228
(1967).
33. KORNBLUM, supra note 6, § 1:16.
34. Crisci, 66 Cal. 2d at 433-34, 426 P.2d at 179, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 19.
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Comunale,35 adding that "[1]iability is imposed not for bad faith
breach of the contract but for failure to meet the duty to accept rea-
sonable settlements, a duty included within the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing." 36 Furthermore, the court found that a
cause of action for bad faith was not dependent upon proof of actual
dishonesty, fraud, or concealment. 37
The court in Crisci was able to lay quite a foundation for future
bad faith liability and was the first case to allow recovery against an
insurer for mental suffering.38 The extreme facts in this third-party
case made it all possible.3 9 Mrs. Crisci, an elderly immigrant widow
whose primary asset was her apartment building, had a $10,000 liabil-
ity insurance policy with the defendant insurance company covering
her building. One of her tenants fell through a defective step in an
outside stairway and was left hanging for some period of time.
Although the tenant sustained only minor injuries, she developed a
severe psychosis, and subsequently filed a personal injury suit against
Mrs. Crisci for $400,000.40 .
The defendant insurance company rejected a settlement demand of
$9,000 of which Mrs. Crisci offered to pay $2,500, even though they
knew that the tenant could recover a possible verdict of at least
$100,000.41 The insurer offered no more than $3,000. The suit went
to trial where the tenant was awarded a jury verdict of $101,000.42
The verdict was affirmed on appeal, and the insurer paid its $10,000
policy limit, leaving Mrs. Crisci responsible for the excess judgment
of $91,000.43 As a result, Mrs. Crisci lost her property, becoming indi-
gent, which led to her decline in health and subsequent suicide at-
tempts.44 She eventually brought suit against the insurance company
for its wrongful refusal to settle within the policy'limits.
In holding Security Insurance Company liable for the excess judg-
35. Id. at 429, 426 P.2d at 177, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 16. See also supra notes 24-30 and
accompanying text.
36. Crisci, 66 Cal. 2d at 430, 426 P.2d at 177, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 17.
37. Id.
38. Comment, An Insurance Company's Duty to Settle: Qualified or Absolute?, 41
S. CAL. L. REV. 120, 134 & n.78 (1968).
39. Callahan, Some Thoughts on the Avoidance of Extra-Contractual Damages in
California Insurance Litigation, 14 W. ST. U.L. REV. 73, 96, 103 (1986).
40. Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 428, 426 P.2d 173, 175, 58 Cal. Rptr.
13, 15 (1967).
41. Id. at 428, 426 P.2d at 175-76, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 15-16.
42. $100,000 was for the tenant and $1000 was for her husband. Id.
43. Id. at 428-29, 426 P.2d at 176, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 16.
44. Id. at 429, 426 P.2d at 176, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 16.
ment and the resulting mental suffering,45 the supreme court noted
that liability insurance contracts are personal in nature, and not com-
mercial.4 6 Therefore, where there exists a special relationship be-
tween the parties resulting from an extreme disparity in the parties'
bargaining positions and financial situations, insurance companies
will be held liable if they do not fulfill their contractual obligations
with good faith and fair dealing.47
The establishment of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing in Brown, Comunale, and Crisci formed the basis of insurer
liability for damages to its insured resulting from a third party's
claim against the insured. The next step in the development of bad
faith liability in California was the extension of bad faith liability to
insureds in first-party claims.48 One case leading the California
courts to award extra-contractual damages to insureds in first-party
cases was Wetherbee v. United Insurance Co. of America.49
In Wetherbee, the court of appeal held that an insurer who enters
into a disability insurance policy without intending to perform the
obligations could be liable for both actual and punitive damages. 50
Despite the insurer's representations to the contrary, its intent not to
perform the obligations under the contract could be inferred from its
subsequent refusal to pay a valid claim. 5 1
The insured in Wetherbee had thought about canceling her insur-
ance policy; she decided to retain it after receiving a letter from her
insurance company assuring her that should she become sick or in-
jured she would be entitled to lifetime benefits and that the policy
could not be terminated if she became permanently disabled.52
45. Id. at 433-34, 426 P.2d at 179, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 19.
46. Id. at 434, 426 P.2d at 179, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 19.
[P]laintiff did not seek by the contract involved here to obtain a commercial
advantage but to protect herself against the risks of accidental losses, includ-
ing the mental distress which might follow from the losses. Among the con-
siderations in purchasing liability insurance, as insurers are well aware, is the
peace of mind and security it will provide in the event of an accidental loss,
and recovery of damages for mental suffering has been permitted for breach
of contracts which directly concern the comfort, happiness or personal esteem
of one of the parties.
Id (citations omitted).
47. MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 1.8, at 23; see Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d
425, 433-34, 426 P.2d 173, 179, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13, 19 (1967).
48. See supra note 21. "Most commentators... disagree with this extension of bad
faith into first party cases and view it as more of a social policy decision on the part of
the courts to deter untoward conduct." Callahan, supra note 39, at 103.
49. 265 Cal. App. 2d 921, 71 Cal. Rptr. 764 (1968).
50. Id. at 932, 71 Cal. Rptr. at 770. The court found that the insurer's post-claim
conduct was sufficient to support their conclusion that the insurer never intended to
fulfill the obligations of either the renewed first policy or the subsequently purchased
policy. Id. at 932, 71 Cal. Rptr. at 770-71.
51. Id. at 931-32, 71 Cal. Rptr. at 769-70.
52. Id at 925, 71 Cal. Rptr. at 766.
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Shortly after retaining her policy she suffered a stroke which ren-
dered her permanently disabled. After paying benefits for two years,
the insurance company discontinued the payments.
Prior to discontinuing the payments, the insurer sent the insured's
physician a letter asking how long the disability would last in order
to be able to cut off the benefits as soon as possible.53 In addition to
the letter, the insurer conducted its own investigation into the in-
sured's physical capabilities in an effort to stop the payments, but
was unable to discover any information to invalidate her claim.54
However, a later discovery revealed that the insured was able to go to
church and make her monthly visits to her physician.55 As a result,
the insurer cut off her disability payments. 56 The appellate court
found the insurer's conduct to be unreasonable5 7 and fraudulent. It
therefore affirmed an award of actual and punitive damages in this
first-party suit.5
8
In the 1970 case of Fletcher v. Western National Life Insurance
Co.,59 California became the first state to extend bad faith liability to
first parties.60 In addition, Fletcher is well-known for being the first
case to make use of intentional infliction of emotional distress as it
applies to insurance.61
53. Id. at 932, 71 Cal. Rptr. at 770. "The [insurer) sent [the insured's] physician an
artfully worded letter which indicated its desire to assure [the insured] uninterrupted
coverage and added, apparently as an afterthought, a postscript inquiring whether [the
insured] was continously confined within her home." Id.
54. Id. at 925, 71 Cal. Rptr. at 770.
55. Id. at 926, 71 Cal. Rptr. at 776. This discovery was supported by the insured's
physician's response to the insurer's letter. The physician had responded that the in-
sured was not confined to her home, as she was capable of making her appointments
with the aid of a crutch, a footbrace, and another person. Id.
56. Id. at 932, 71 Cal. Rptr. at 770.
57. For a list of the types of conduct modern courts consider "unreasonable" in
bad faith actions, see KORNBLUM, supra note 6 4:57.
58. Wetherbee v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 265 Cal. App. 2d 921, 931-32, 71 Cal. Rptr.
764, 770 (1968).
59. 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970).
60. ASHLEY, supra note 5, §§ 2:03-2:04.
61. Id. at 397, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 90. See also Note, The Widening Scope of Damages
for the Disability Insurer: Fletcher v. National Life Insurance Co., 7 CAL. W.L. REV.
496, 501-502 (1971); Note, Damages For Mental Suffering Caused by Insurers: Recent
Developments in the Law of Tort and Contract, 48 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1303, 1307
(1973); Note, Insurance-Disability Insurer's Refusal to Pay Gives Rise to Action in
Tort-Fletcher v. Western National Life Insurance Co., 47 WASH. L. REV. 489, 492
(1972). For a discussion on the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress and
its application to insurance, see Keenan & Gillespie, The Insurer and The Tort of the
International [sic] Infliction of Mental Distress: Fletcher v. Western National Life In-
surance Co., 39 INS. COUN. J. 335 (1972).
Although the court of appeal in fletcher expressed liability in
terms of intentional infliction of emotional distress,62 it opened the
door for first-party bad faith actions by noting:
An insurer owes to its insured an implied-in-law duty of good faith and fair
dealing that it will do nothing to deprive the insured of the benefits of the
policy. Included within this duty in the case of a liability insurance policy is
the duty to act reasonably and in good faith to settle claims against the in-
sured by a third person.... We think that, similarly, the implied-in-law duty
of good faith and fair dealing imposes upon a disability insurer a duty not to
threaten to withhold or actually withhold payments, maliciously and without
probable cause, for the purpose of injuring its insured by depriving him of the
benefits of the policy. We think that.., the violation of that duty sounds in
tort notwithstanding that it also constitutes a breach of contract.6 3
The court also held that "independent of the tort of intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress, such conduct on the part of a disability
insurer constitutes tortious interference with a protected property in-
terest of its insured for which damages may be recovered for... eco-
nomic loss as well as emotional distress ... and, in a proper case,
punitive damages."6 4
Just as the facts in Crisci and Wetherbee led the courts to compen-
sate the victims for the insurers' claims-handling abuses, the facts in
1letcher also illustrate the types of abuses the courts have been at-
tempting to eliminate. The insured in fRetcher, a forty-one-year-old
manual laborer and father of eight children, had purchased disability
insurance from the insurer to provide disability payments in the
event of his becoming totally disabled. While insured, Fletcher sus-
tained a back injury, the result of a lifting accident at work. The in-
surer began paying disability benefits but one of its claims
supervisors immediately set out to find some way to characterize the
insured's injury as a "sickness," thereby allowing the insurer to cut
off payments after two years, as provided by the terms of the
policy. 65
Although the doctors involved unanimously agreed that the in-
sured was injured as a result of the lifting accident, the claims super-
visor seized upon every opportunity to classify it as a sickness.66 At
one point, the supervisor interpreted a medical diagnosis which
stated that the insured's back injury involved an "irritation of the
cauda equina," a collection of spinal roots resembling the tail of a
62. Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 385, 89 Cal. Rptr.
78, 92 (1970).
63. Id. at 401, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 93 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
64. Id. at 401-02, 89 Cal. Rptr at 93-94.
65. Id. at 388, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 84. The policy provided that if the disability was due
to "sickness," the payments of $150.00 per.month would be limited to two years, but if
the disability were caused by an "injury" they could continue for up to 30 years. Id. at
386, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 83.
66. Id. at 388-89, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 84-85.
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horse,67 to mean that the insured had contracted a sickness from a
horse.68 Later, the claims supervisor discovered a suggestion in one
of the medical reports that the insured's injury may have been con-
tributed to by a "congenital back ailment." Because the insured had
not disclosed this congenital back ailment on his application the in-
surer accused him of fraudulently concealing the information, termi-
nated the payments, and demanded the return of all previously paid
benefits.69 Knowing that the insured was completely unaware of the
congenital back ailment at the time he applied for the insurance, and
that his family was in a difficult financial situation, 70 the claims su-
pervisor tendered a settlement offer for the release of the policy and
threatened to sue if it was not accepted.71 In the subsequent trial,
the claims supervisor admitted that he would use the same tactics
again if a similar situation arose.7 2
After reviewing the outrageous7S claims practices of the insurer,
the appellate court affirmed the award from the lower court 74 and
held that:
[D]efendants' threatened and actual bad faith refusals to make payments
under the policy, maliciously employed by defendants in concert with false
and threatening communications directed to plaintiff for the purpose of caus-
ing him to surrender his policy or disadvantageously settle a nonexistent dis-
pute is essentially tortious in nature and is conduct that may legally be the
basis for an action for damages for intentional infliction of emotional
distress.7 5
By allowing recovery of tort damages in an insurance breach of con-
tract case, the appellate court recognized a possible independent tort
cause of action for an insurer's breach of the implied covenant of
67.. Id. at 388 n.3, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 84 n.3.
68. Id. at 388, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 84.
69. IM at 389-90, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 85.
70. I& at 389, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 85. As a result of the payments being withheld, the
insured's family lived on macaroni, beans, and potatoes (causing the insured's subse-
quent 47 pound weight gain). They lacked clothing, lost some land, had their utilities
shut off, and the house payments became delinquent. A daughter had to leave school,
his wife had to go to work, and he was forced to beg money from his friends and neigh-
bors to make ends meet. I& at 394, 398, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 88, 91.
71. Id, at 390, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 85.
72. Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 392, 89 Cal. Rptr.
78, 87 (1970).
73. Id.
74. The jury returned a verdict of $710,000 in damages; $60,000 compensatory and
$650,000 punitive. IM at 408, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 98. However, the insured later accepted a
final award of $60,000 in compensatory and $180,000 in punitive damages. I& at 409, 89
Cal. Rptr. at 99.
75. IM at 401, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 92.
good faith and fair dealing in a first-party case. 76
The appellate court in Fletcher took a step forward in first-party
bad faith cases, but in 1973, the California Supreme Court picked up
the pace in Gruenberg v. Aetna Insurance Co. 77 The court firmly
held that, as in third-party cases, if the insurer acts in bad faith, it
will be liable for tort damages.78 Using the foundation set by earlier
decisions, the court stated:
(I]n every insurance contract there is an implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing. The duty to so act is immanent (sic) in the contract whether the
company is attending to the claims of third persons against the insured or the
claims of the insured itself. Accordingly, when the insurer unreasonably and
in bad faith withholds payment of the claim of its insured, it is subject to lia-
bility in tort.7 9
It also noted that the implied covenant is an obligation imposed by
law and, therefore, breach of the covenant would give rise to a tort
measure of damages, as opposed to only what is due under the terms
of the contract.S0 Furthermore, the court made it clear that because
the insured was basing his claim solely on breach of the implied cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing, the insurer's conduct did not have
to be "outrageous," "severe," or display an intent to inflict emotional
distress, all of which are prerequisites of a cause of action for inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress.$1 The court stated that "since
plaintiff has alleged substantial damages for loss of property apart
from damages for mental distress, the complaint is sufficiently
pleaded with respect to the latter element of damages."8 2 Bad faith
was now a separate and distinct tort theory with recoverable emo-
tional distress damages.
The facts in Gruenberg leading the court to this landmark decision
were not as egregious as those in Crisci or Fletcher, but they were
indicative of the types of insurer conduct the courts were apparently
trying to curtail.83 Mr. Gruenberg's restaurant, which was insured
76. MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 1.8, at 24.
77. 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973).
78. Id at 581, 510 P.2d at 1042, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 490. See also Parks & Heil, Insur-
ers Beware: "Bad Faith" is in Full Bloom, 9 FORUM 63, 71 (1973); Comment, An In-
dependent Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing in Insurance Contracts-Gruenberg
v. Aetna Insurance Co., 11 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 492, 498 (1974); Note, Good Faith and
Fair Dealing in Insurance Contracts: Gruenberg v. Aetna Insurance Co., 25 HASTINGS
L.J. 699, 701 (1974).
79. Gruenberg, 9 Cal. 3d at 575, 510 P.2d at 1038, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 486.
80. Id. at 574, 510 P.2d at 1037, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 485.
81. Id. at 579-81, 510 P.2d at 1041-42, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 489-90.
82. Id at 580, 510 P.2d at 1042, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 490.
83. See MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 1.8, at 27. By removing the standards of "out-
rageous" and "severe" from the requirements of a bad faith action, the court in
Gruenberg "released the insured from the necessity of grafting the essential elements
of a cause of action for the independent action [for bad faith]." Id As a result, "when
the terms and conditions for payment have been fulfilled, refusal to pay is a clear ex-
ercise of bad faith." Id. § 1.9, at 39. Compare Gruenberg, 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032,
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for a total of $35,000 by three insurance companies, was destroyed by
fire. While he was at the fire scene Gruenberg got into an argument
with a fire department arson investigator and was arrested. The in-
surer's claims adjustor later informed the arson investigator that
Gruenberg had excess coverage and, as a result, Gruenberg was also
charged with insurance fraud.
While charges were pending against Gruenberg, the insurers' law-
yer demanded an examination under oath pursuant to the "coopera-
tion and notice" clause of the policy. Gruenberg refused to appear
for the examination while the criminal charges were still pending.
At the preliminary hearing on the charges of arson and fraud, the in-
surers' adjustor testified as to Gruenberg's excess coverage. The
criminal charges were subsequently dismissed due to lack of probable
cause. Gruenberg notified the claims adjustor that he would agree to
appear for the examination. The adjustor then took the position that
Gruenberg's claim was void and denied liability because of his earlier
refusal to submit to the examination.8 4 Gruenberg then brought a
cause of action against the insurers for breach of the implied cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing, alleging that the defendants "will-
fully and maliciously entered into a scheme to deprive him of the
benefits" due under his insurance policy.8 5 In allowing Gruenberg to
recover for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, the court noted: "While it might be argued that defendants
would be excused from their contractual duties (e.g., obligation to in-
demnify) if plaintiff breached his obligations under the policies, we
do not think that plaintiff's alleged breach excuses defendants from
their duty, implied by law, of good faith and fair dealing."8 6 There-
fore, an insurer's duty of good faith and fair dealing in a first-party
claim is independent of the insured's obligation under the contract.
In the evolution of bad faith tort liability in California, Gruenberg
exemplified the emerging trend in the 1970's of allowing more bad
faith claims to succeed in cases involving substantially less egregious
108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973) and Silberg v. California Life Ins. Co., 11 Cal. 3d 452, 521 P.2d
1103, 113 Cal. Rptr. 711 (1974) with Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d
173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1973) and Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d
376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1967). (The former involved substanially less egregious conduct
and more of a "taking a stand on the policy" approach, while the latter involved asser-
tive misconduct and substantially more outrageous behavior.).
84. Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 571, 510 P.2d 1032, 1035, 108 Cal.
Rptr. 480, 483 (1973).
85. Id. at 575, 510 P.2d at 1038, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 486.
86. Id. at 578, 510 P.2d at 1040, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 488.
conduct by the insurer.8 7 Silberg v. California Life Insurance Co.,88
decided shortly after Gruenberg, further exemplified this emerging
trend. In Silberg, Silberg was insured for hospital and surgical bene-
fits under a policy which protected him against ruinous medical
bills.89 He was injured when he stepped on the top of a glass lid
washing machine, while attempting to locate the source of smoke
coming from a laundromat adjacent to his own business. The glass
top broke and Silberg's foot fell into the rapidly spinning machine,
severing it at the ankle. His foot was later repaired, but he was hos-
pitalized five times for surgery.
Silberg subsequently made claims for medical benefits under both
worker's compensation and his policy with California Life, both of
which were denied. His insurer refused to pay any benefits because
the policy excluded injuries covered by worker's compensation. 90
Therefore, it took a "wait-and-see" approach until after the outcome
of the worker's compensation claim.91 After two years of litigation,
the worker's compensation claim was finally settled for a nominal
amount.92 The insurer then refused any payment under the policy,
claiming that the settlement under worker's compensation precluded
further claims on their policy. 93 Finally, the insurer offered Silberg a
minimal amount to avoid litigation, but Silberg refused 94 and sued
the insurer for the policy benefits as well as both compensatory and
punitive damages.95
The supreme court in Silberg held that the insurer had violated its
tort duty of good faith and fair dealing as a matter of law.96 The con-
duct which led to the court's decision was (1) the insurer's interpreta-
tion of an ambiguous policy provision to its own advantage; (2) the
insurer's failure to explain why it had not paid the benefits and then
filed a lien against the workers' compensation claim; and (3) the in-
surer's refusal to pay the benefits, knowing the financial condition of
87. See supra note 83.
88. 11 Cal. 3d 452, 521 P.2d 1103, 113 Cal. Rptr. 711 (1974).
89. Id. at 461, 521 P.2d at 1109, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 717. "[T]he company's policy ap-
plication declared in large, heavy type, 'Protect Yourself Against the Medical Bills
That Can Ruin You'." Id The policy covered hospital expenses, including fees for sur-
gery, but excluded "losses caused by injuries for which compensation was payable
under any workmen's compensation law." Id. at 456, 521 P.2d at 1105, 113 Cal. Rptr. at
713.
90. Id
91. Id at 459, 521 P.2d at 1108, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 716.
92. Id at 456, 521 P.2d at 1105, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 713. The Worker's Compensation
Appeals Board settled Silberg's claim for $3700. Id He had already incurred $6900 in
medical bills, of which only $1100 was included in the worker's compensation settle-
ment. Id.
93. Id
94. Id. at 458, 521 P.2d at 1107, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 715.
95. Id at 456, 521 P.2d at 1106, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 714.
96. Id at 462, 521 P.2d at 1109, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 717.
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Silberg.97 The court further noted that "[t]he scope of the duty of an
insurer to deal fairly with its insured is prescribed by law and cannot
be delineated entirely by the customs of the insurance industry."98
In addition, the court held that a finding of bad faith "alone does not
necessarily establish that [the insurer] acted with the requisite intent
to injure [the insured]."9 9 Therefore, an insurer must be guilty of
"oppression, fraud, or malice"'1 before an award of punitive dam-
ages can be justified under section 3294(a) of the California Civil
Code.101
Thus far in the evolution of common law tort liability of bad faith,
unreasonable insurer conduct had been delineated and a cause of ac-
tion had emerged for the insured against its insurer in both first-
party and third-party claims. The inevitable question in this develop-
ment, however, was to what extent a third-party victim, who is not a
party to the insurance contract, may have a cause of action against
the tortfeasor's insurer for bad faith conduct. Although some appel-
late court decisions had discussed a third party's cause of action, 102
the arguments and decisions in this regard are best exemplified by
the California Supreme Court's decision in Murphy v. Allstate Insur-
ance Co. 1
0 3
In Murphy, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant, who was in-
sured by Allstate, had caused the wrongful death of her nine-year-old
son. Allstate rejected a settlement offer within the policy limits
($25,000) and the plaintiff was awarded a verdict of $85,000.104 All-
97. Id. at 461-62, 521 P.2d at 1109, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 717. The insurer had knowl-
edge of the extreme financial problems that Silberg was having as a result of their
nonpayment of benefits, including his substantial medical bills from his multiple hospi-
talizations, offset by only his modest ($500 per month) income, and the failure of his
business, his nonpayment of rent, his loss of utilities, and his two nervous breakdowns.
Id,
98. Id. at 462, 521 P.2d at 1109, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 717.
99. Id. at 462-63, 521 P.2d at 1110, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 718.
100. Id. at 462, 521 P.2d at 1110, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 718.
101. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294(a) (West Supp. 1989).
102. See Austero v. Nat'l Casualty Co., 62 Cal. App. 3d 511, 133 Cal. Rptr. 107 (1976)
(no cause of action by insured's wife against insurer because she was not a party to the
insurance contract); Zahn v. Canadian Indem. Co., 57 Cal. App. 3d 509, 129 Cal. Rptr.
286 (1976) (insurer's duty to accept reasonable settlement offer is one owed to the in-
sured and not the injured third party); Shapero v. Allstate Ins. Co., 14 Cal. App. 3d 433,
92 Cal. Rptr. 244 (1971) (no duty on part of insurer to settle with third party claimant
where no risk of excess verdict to the insured's estate existed).
103. 17 Cal. 3d 937, 553 P.2d 584, 132 Cal. Rptr. 424 (1976), rev'd, 46 Cal. 3d 287, 785
P.2d 58, 250 Cal. Rptr. 116 (1988).
104. Id at 940, 553 P.2d at 586, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 426. On motion for a new trial the
verdict was reduced to $42,000. Id
state then advised that it would pay only the policy limits and subse-
quently denied any obligation owing to either its insured or the
plaintiff. The plaintiff then brought an action against Allstate, alleg-
ing that it breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing with its in-
sured by refusing to settle the plaintiff's claim within the policy
limits.105
Instead of alleging that the insured had assigned the cause of ac-
tion to her, the plaintiff argued that the duty of good faith and fair
dealing should be extended to third party claimants. First, plaintiff
argued that section 11580(b)(2) of the California Insurance Code au-
thorized her to proceed directly against the insurer.10 6 However, the
court noted that "section 11580 must be read in light of the Financial
Responsibility Law"' 0 7 and that "neither [the] third party beneficiary
doctrine nor the Financial Responsibility Law warrant granting the
injured claimant the right to recover from the insurer for breach of
the [duty to settle]."108 Furthermore, the court held:
A third party should not be permitted to enforce covenants made not for his
benefit, but rather for others. He is not a contracting party; his right to per-
formance is predicated on the contracting parties intent to benefit him. As to
any provision made not for his benefit but for the benefit of the contracting
parties... he becomes an intermeddler. Permitting a third party to enforce a
covenant made solely to benefit others would lead to the anomaly of granting
him a bonus after his receiving all intended benefit. Because... the duty to
settle is intended to benefit the insured and not the injured claimant, third
party beneficiary doctrine does not furnish a basis for the latter to recover.1 0 9
The plaintiff then asserted that a direct action was permitted by a
creditor's suit under section 720 of the California Code of Civil Proce-
dure.11o However, the court reasoned:
Because causes of action for tort committed to property are assignable, they
105. Id
106. Id, Section 11580, subdivision (b) of the Insurance Code states:
Such policy shall not be thus issued . . . unless it contains all the following
provisions:
(2) A provision that whenever judgment is secured against the insured or
the executor or administrator of a deceased insured in an action based upon
bodily injury, death, or property damage, then an action may be brought
against the insurer on the policy and subject to its terms and limitations, by
such judgment creditor to recover on the judgment.
CAL. INS. CODE § 11580(b) (West 1972).
107. Murphy v. Allstate Ins. Co., 17 Cal. 3d 937, at 943-44, 553 P.2d 584, 588, 132 Cal.
Rptr. 424, 428 (citing Barrera v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 71 Cal. 2d 659, 670, 456
P.2d 674, 682, 79 Cal. Rptr. 106, 114 (1969)).
108. Id. at 944, 553 P.2d at 588, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 428.
109. Id (citations omitted).
110. Id. at 940, 553 P.2d at 586, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 426. Section 720 of the Code of
Civil Procedure provided:
If it appears that a person or corporation, alleged to have property of the judg-
ment debtor, or to be indebted to him, claims an interest in the property ad-
verse to him, or denies the debt, the judgment creditor may maintain an
action against such person or corporation for the recovery of such interest or
debt ....
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may be reached by proceedings under section 720. On the other hand, section
720 should not be applied so as to render the nonassignable assignable. And
nonassignable tort actions [for punitive, emotional, and personal injury dam-
age] may not be reached in proceedings pursuant to section 720.111
In addition, because a cause of action for bad faith was considered a
hybrid of assignable (excess judgment) and potentially nonassignable
(punitive, emotional, and personal injury) damages, and due to the
potential conflicts between the injured, the insured, and the insurer,
recovery under section 720 was held unavailable.11 2
However, the court did hold that insureds could partially assign
and then join in the claimant's action, thereby permitting the insured
to be covered from personal liability, allowing the judgment creditor
to gain control of its cause of action, and protecting the insured's
"right to nonassignable claims for punitive, emotional and personal
injury damage."1 13 Furthermore, an "insured may assign his cause of
action for breach of the duty to settle without consent of the insur-
ance carrier, even when the policy provisions provide the
contrary."114
By unanimously holding that the insurer's duty of good faith and
fair dealing runs only to its insured, the supreme court in Murphy
answered one of the key questions remaining in the development of
pre-Royal Globe bad faith tort liability. As one commentator noted:
The remedy of the injured party was clear: a suit against the insured. The in-
sured, in turn, had standing to sue the carrier directly for a breach of the im-
plied covenant of fair dealing and good faith if the insured [sic] had
wrongfully refused to settle and a judgment exceeding the policy limits was
rendered. The injured claimant could obtain an assignment of this cause of
action to proceed against the insurance company.
1 1 5
Subsequent cases further refined the tort duty of good faith and fair
dealing as it related to the insurance industry,116 culminating in the
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 720 (West 1987) (repealed 1982 Cal. Stat. ch. 1364, § 1, p. 507-0).
See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 7-08.180 (West 1988) (current provision).
111. Murphy v. Allstate Ins. Co., 17 Cal. 3d 937, 946, 553 P.2d 584, 589-90, 132 Cal.
Rptr. 424, 429-30 (citations omitted).
112. Id. at 946, 553 P.2d at 590, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 430.
113. Id. at 946-7, 553 P.2d at 590, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 429-30.
114. Id.
115. Note, Royal Globe Insurance Co. v. Superior Court: Right to Direct Suit
Against an Insurer by a Third Party Claimant, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 1161, 1166-67 (1980).
116. See, e.g., Neal v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 21 Cal. 3d 910, 922-23, 582 P.2d 980, 986-87,
148 Cal. Rptr. 389, 395-96 (1978) (court affirmed award of punitive damages based on
showing of oppression, fraud, and malice in insurer's attempt to coerce an uninsured
motorist settlement); Cancino v. Farmers Ins. Group, 80 Cal. App. 3d 335, 344-45, 145
Cal. Rptr. 503, 508-09 (1978) (person loading vehicle held to be additional insured
under policy and, therefore, had standing to sue for wrongfully withheld benefits).
landmark case of Royal Globe Insurance Co. v. Superior Court.117
Because "statutory law proved to be the springboard for imposing a
duty toward third party claimants,""s and because Royal Globe was
based upon the existing statutory law and its interpretation, a brief
overview of the pre-Royal Globe statutory law is required.
B. Pre-Royal Globe Bad Faith Liability: Statutory Law
Consumers of insurance in California are protected not only by
common law actions under traditional theories, such as bad faith, but
they are also protected by statutory regulation under the Unfair
Practices Act.119 The Unfair Practices Act was enacted in 1959 by
the California Legislature in order to regulate unfair trade practices
in the insurance industry.120 It was modeled after the National Asso-
ciation of Insurance Commissioners model act which was drafted in
1947.121 By 1971, most states had adopted similar statutes.122
The unfair and deceptive acts prohibited under the Unfair Prac-
tices Act are enumerated in section 790.03 of the California Insurance
Code.123 Section 790.03(h) lists fifteen unfair claims practices prohib-
ited in settlement negotiations.X2 4 According to one author, "the
117. 23 Cal. 3d 880, 592 P.2d 329, 153 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1979).
118. Comment, Rodriguez v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Companies, Inc.: An Illus-
tration of the Problems Inherent in the Royal Globe Doctrine, 15 Sw. U.L. REV. 371, 379
(1985).
119. 1959 Cal. Stat. ch. 1737, § 1, at 4187 (codified at CAL. INS. CODE §§ 790-790.10
(West 1972 & Supp. 1989)). See also Note, supra note 115, at 1167-72 (author gives a
brief, yet detailed history of regulation of the insurance industry).
120. CAL. INS. CODE § 790 (West 1972).
121. Note, supra note 115, at 1167-68 & nn.47-51.
122. Shernoff, Insurance Company Bad Faith Law, A Potent Weapon for Con-
sumer Protection, 17 TRIAL 22, 24 (May 1981). For a list of jurisdictions with Unfair
Claims Practices Statutes, see MCCARTHY, supra note 5, at 591-93 (Appendix I).
123. CAL. INS. CODE § 790.03 (West Supp. 1989).
124. Id. § 790.03(h). Section 790.3 provides in pertinent part:
The following are hereby defined as unfair methods of competition and un-
fair and deceptive acts or practices in the business of insurance.
(h) Knowingly committing or performing with such frequency as to indi-
cate a general business practice any of the following unfair claims settlement
practices:
(1) Misrepresenting to claimants pertinent facts or insurance policy provi-
sions relating to any coverages at issue.
(2) Failing to acknowledge and act reasonably promptly upon communica-
tions with respect to claims arising under insurance policies.
(3) Failing to adopt and implement reasonable standards for the prompt
investigation and processing of claims arising under insurance policies.
(4) Failing to affirm or deny coverage of claims within a reasonable time
after proof of loss requirements have been completed and submitted by the
insured.
(5) Not attempting in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair, and equitable
settlements of claims in which liability has become reasonably clear.
(6) Compelling insureds to institute litigation to recover amounts due
under an insurance policy by offering substantially less than the amounts ulti-
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types of insurer misconduct constituting common law bad faith with
respect to the handling of claims are generally the same type of mis-
conduct addressed by [the Unfair Practices Act]."125
Enforcement under the Unfair Practices Act is primarily through
the Insurance Commissioner who is given the authority to examine
and investigate business affairs,126 issue orders to show cause,127 con-
duct hearings,128 issue injunctive orders,' 29 levy fines and penal-
ties,130 suspend or revoke licenses,' 3 ' and promulgate rules and
regulations necessary for the administration of the Act.'3 2 However,
as one commentator noted:
mately recovered in actions brought by such insureds, when such insureds
have made claims for amounts reasonably similar to the amounts ultimately
recovered.
(7) Attempting to settle a claim by an insured for less than the amount to
which a reasonable man would have believed he was entitled by reference to
written or printed advertising material accompanying or made part of an ap-
plication.
(8) Attempting to settle claims on the basis of an application which was
altered without notice to, or knowledge or consent of, the insured, his repre-
sentative, agent, or broker.
(9) Failing, after payment of a claim, to inform insureds or beneficiaries,
upon request by them, of the coverage under which payment has been made.
(10) Making known to insureds or claimants a practice of the insurer of
appealing from arbitration awards in favor of insureds or claimants for the
purpose of compelling them to accept settlements or compromises less than
the amount awarded in arbitration.
(11) Delaying the investigation or payment of claims by requiring an in-
sured, claimant, or the physician of either, to submit a preliminary claim re-
port, and then requiring the subsequent submission of formal proof of loss
forms, both of which submissions contain substantially the same information.
(12) Failing to settle claims promptly, where -liability has become appar-
ent, under one portion of the insurance policy coverage in order to influence
settlements under other portions of the insurance policy coverage.
(13) Failing to provide promptly a reasonable explanation of the basis re-
lied on in the insurance policy, in relation to the facts or applicable law, for
the denial of a claim or for the offer of a compromise settlement.
(14) Directly advising a claimant not to obtain the services of an attorney.
(15) Misleading a claimant as to the applicable statute of limitations.
125. MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 1.11, at 43. In addition, McCarthy notes:'
Three recent cases have emphasized that a statutory bad faith action as pro-
vided for by the California Unfair Practices Act (Cal. Ins. Code § 790.03) is
merely a codification of, and is coextensive with, a common-law bad faith ac-
tion against an insurer, having identical elements, standards, and remedies.
Id § 2.21, at 250:51 (citations omitted).
126. CAL. INS. CODE § 790.04 (West 1972).
127. Id. §§ 790.05, 790.06(a).
128. Id. § 790.06.
129. Id. § 790.06(d).
130. CAL. INS. CODE § 790.07 (West Supp. 1989).
131. Id.
132. CAL. INS. CODE' § 790.10 (West 1972).
[A]lthough there has been significant consumer protection legislation directed
at unfair claims practices on the books since the early 1970s, insurance com-
missioners ... have rarely sought to enforce these important statutes. Even
when an insurance commissioner has attempted enforcement, the only rem-
edy--and it is not really an effective remedy-has been a cease and desist or-
der and a penalty of $50 for violation of such an order, or $500 for a willful
violation.1 3
3
The enforcement problem came to an abrupt halt when the Califor-
nia Supreme Court, in Royal Globe134 "held that no longer were the
statutory remedies the private domain of insurance commissioners,
but now, for the first time, the commissioner could receive the un-
wanted help of trial lawyers who could bring bad faith actions based
upon violations of these statutes."135
III. THE IMPACT OF ROYAL GLOBE ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF BAD
FAITH LIABILITY
As the preceding section indicates, by 1979 the tort of bad faith, or
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, was firmly es-
tablished as a common law cause of action which would address the
unfair practices of insurance companies in California. Insureds had
common law causes of action for insurer's bad faith conduct in both
third-party claims136 and first-party cases,la 7while third-party victims
133. Shernoff, supra note 122, at 24. The enforcement problem and the "apathy,
ineffectiveness, and failure of administrative agencies to adequately regulate insurance
companies" was explained in Levine, supra note 18, at 626, wherein the author quotes
an excerpt from the JOINT LEGISLATIVE AUDIT COMMITTEE, REPORT TO THE CALIFOR-
NIA LEGISLATURE: REVIEW OF THE DISCIPLINARY FUNCTION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF IN-
SURANCE, SUMMARY 1 (1977):
The Department of Insurance's organization and procedures for investigating
and resolving public complaints against insurance companies and agents are
seriously deficient. Little effort is made to investigate overall patterns of com-
plaints about insurers' business practices upon which serious discipline might
be based. Although the Department more effectively addresses public com-
plaints against insurance agents, inadequate management of the investigation
of these complaints has resulted in insufficient investigations and an unneces-
sary backlog of work. The Department's fragmented organization of investi-
gative and disciplinary functions and a lack of uniform procedures compound
these problems.
In its disciplinary actions, the Department's Legal Division has given prefer-
ential treatment to selected licensees, notably insurance companies and those
insurance agents whose attorneys are former key Department officials. Such
licensees have been permitted to negotiate and reduce proposed discipline in a
manner inconsistent with normal Department procedure.
The Department's inability to enforce the Unfair Practices Act was further
commented upon by Los Angeles city attorney James Hahn when he stated
that the Department's lack of resources ($30 million budget compared to $30
billion of insurance written in California) and the appointment, rather than
the election, of the Insurance Commissioner are the keys to the Department's
ineffectiveness. Hahn, supra note 3, at 7.
134. 23 Cal. 3d 880, 592 P.2d 329, 153 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1979). For a discussion of how
the courts interpreted the Act prior to Royal Globe, see Houser, Unfair Claims Settle-
ment Practices Act-How the Courts Have Interpreted the Act, 15 FORUM 336 (1979).
135. Shernoff, supra note 122, at 24.
136. See supra text accompanying notes 21-47.
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could recover for some violations by obtaining an assignment from
the insured.1ss In addition, insurer's bad faith conduct was regulated
statutorily under the Unfair Practices Act.13 9 Bad faith, and the pu-
nitive damages associated with it, had begun "to acquire the charac-
teristics of a strong, silent consumer public advocate."140
In 1979, bad faith via Royal Globe became a strong consumer advo-
cate by adding "a new weapon to the arsenal of trial lawyers in pro-
tecting the rights of insurance consumers." 141 "[F]or the first time,
third party claimants could sue the insurer directly for certain unfair
practices after conclusion of the liability action against the
insured."142
In Royal Globe, the "sole issue... [was] whether an individual who
is injured by the alleged negligence of an insured may sue the negli-
gent party's insurer for violation of [subdivision (h) of section
790.03]."143 The court allowed a third party claimant to bring a cause
of action against an insurer based upon violations of subdivision (h),
provided that any suit the injured party may have had against the in-
sured had been concluded.144
The facts which led the supreme court to this decision were cer-
tainly not as egregious as those in earlier landmark decisions involv-
ing bad faith. The plaintiff, in Royal Globe, filed an action for
personal injuries sustained in a slip-and-fall accident in a food mar-
ket. She subsequently joined defendants Royal Globe Insurance
Company, who insured the market, and an independent adjusting
company which was alleged to be an agent of Royal Globe. She al-
leged that defendants had violated subdivision (h)(5)145 and subdivi-
137. See supra text accompanying notes 48-101.
138. See supra text accompanying notes 102-18.
139. See supra text accompanying notes 119-35.
140. Levine, supra note 15, at 615.
141. Shernoff, supra note 122, at 25. For a thorough survey of the impact of Royal
Globe on insurance bad faith practices, see Callahan, supra note 39; Ailkin & Abeltin,
When Does "The Fat Lady Sing"for Purposes of a Royal Globe Action? Endless Liti-
gation Over What Does or Should Constitute the Resolution of a Claim, 14 W. ST.U. L.
REV. 56 (1986); Comment, A Statutory Action for Insurer Bad Faith-Reasonably Clear
Remedy for the Third Party Claimant, 11 PAC. L.J. (1980); Comment, The Permissibly
Sef-Insured: An Argument For Extension of the Unfair Claims Practices Act, 14 W.
ST. U.L. REV. 251 (1986).
142. KORNBLUM, supra note 6, at 1:24.
143. Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 23 Cal. 3d 880, 884, 592 P.2d 329, 331,
153 Cal. Rptr. at 842, 844 (1979). See supra note 124 for text of section 790.03(h).
144. Royal Globe, 23 Cal. 3d at 884, 592 P.2d at 332, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 845.
145. Subdivision (h)(5) directs insurers to attempt to "effectuate prompt, fair, and
equitable settlements." CAL. INS. CODE § 790.03(h)(5) (West Supp. 1989).
Sion (h)(14).146 Plaintiff sought physical and emotional damages, as
well as punitive damages for these violations.147
Royal Globe demurred and filed a motion for judgment on the
pleadings claiming: (1) that the exclusive power to enforce subdivi-
sion (h) rested with the Insurance Commissioner; (2) that the legisla-
tive intent of subdivision (h) was to protect only the insured and,
therefore, a third-party claimant lacked standing to bring such an ac-
tion; and (3) that the plaintiff must bring separate suits against the
insured and the insurer. After the trial court overruled the demur-
rer and denied the motion, Royal Globe sought a writ of mandate
from the California Supreme Court in an effort to vacate the trial
court's orders.148 The supreme court, in a 4-3 decision, allowed the
writ to issue, but also held that a third-party claimant could bring an
action against an insurer for violating the subdivisions of section
790.03(h).149
The first step in the court's analysis was whether a private litigant
may bring an action against an insurer for violation of section 790.03
of the Insurance Code, or whether section 790.03 grants the sole au-
thority of enforcement to the insurance commissioner.1 50 The court
reasoned that section 790.09 provided private litigants with a cause of
action against insurers who violate the provisions of subsection (h).151
The second step in the court's analysis was whether third-party
claimants are precluded from relying on section 790.03 for a private
cause of action because of the contention that section 790.03 is only
meant to protect insureds.15 2 The court concluded that since section
790.03 refers to claimants, and since the legislative history indicates
that the legislature failed to exercise their opportunity to change the
language of the Act in order to clarify its application, third parties
were to be protected by section 790.03.153 Royal Globe argued that
the supreme court's unanimous decision in Murphy v. Allstate Insur-
146. Subdivision (h)(14) prohibits "[d]irectly advising a claimant not to obtain the
services of an attorney." Id. § 790.03(h)(14).
147. Royal Globe, 23 Cal. 3d at 884, 592 P.2d at 332, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 845.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 884, 892, 592 P.2d at 332, 337, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 845, 850.
150. Id. at 885, 592 P.2d at 332, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 845. The commission is granted the
authority to conduct investigations, CAL. INS. CODE § 790.04 (West 1972), issue cease
and desist orders, Id. § 790.05, and enforce penalties for unfair business practices. Id.
§ 790.08. In addition, section 790.09 provides in pertinent part:
No order to cease and desist issued under this article directed to any person
or subsequent administrative or judicial proceeding to enforce the same shall
in any way relieve or absolve such person from... civil liability or criminal
penalty under the laws of this State arising out of the methods, acts or prac-
tices found unfair or deceptive.
CAL. INS. CODE § 790.09 (West 1986) (emphasis added).
151. Royal Globe, 23 Cal. 3d at 885, 592 P.2d at 332, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 845.
152. Id at 888, 592 P.2d at 334, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 847.
153. Id. at 888-89, 592 P.2d at 334-35, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 847-48.
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ance Co.,154 wherein the court held that a third party could not sue
for breach of the duty to settle,15 should apply to the court's inter-
pretation of section 790.03.156 However, the court distinguished Mur-
phy by reasoning that the plaintiff in Murphy had asserted a right to
sue for breach of the insurer's duty to the insured under the contract,
whereas the plaintiff in Royal Globe was suing the insured based
upon its duty created under section 790.03.157
The final step in the court's analysis was whether a third-party
claimant could sue the insurer and the insured in a single lawsuit.158
The court held that damages suffered by the injured party as a result
of violations of section 790.03(h) are to be determined after the third
party's action against the insured is concluded.159 In reaching this de-
cision, the court relied heavily on section 1155 of the Evidence Code
which prohibits the admission of insurance, due to its prejudicial na-
ture, in certain tort actions.160 Therefore, because the plaintiff's
claim was not concluded, the supreme court allowed the writ of man-
date to issue. 16 1
The three-judge dissent in Royal Globe blasted the majority for its
disregard of the unanimous Murphy decision only three years earlier,
and its erroneous, labored, and strained interpretation of section
790.03.162 The dissent concluded that "neither statutory nor deci-
sional law supports the majority's holding .... It seems predictable
that in almost every case in which an insurer hereinafter declines a
settlement offer the injured third party claimant will be tempted to
file an independent action [for statutory bad faith] against the [insur-
ance company]."163
Royal Globe's impact on the insurance industry was unprecedented.
154. 17 Cal. 3d 937, 553 P.2d 584, 132 Cal. Rptr. 424 (1976).
155. Id at 944, 553 P.2d at 428-29, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 588-89. See also supra text ac-
companying notes 102-14.
156. Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 23 Cal. 3d 880, 889, 592 P.2d 329, 335,
153 Cal. Rptr. 842, 848 (1979).
157. Id. at 889-90, 592 P.2d at 335, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 848.
158. Id at 891-92, 592 P.2d at 336-37, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 849-50.
159. Id.
160. Id. See also CAL. EVID. CODE § 1155 (West 1966). Section 1155 provides: "Evi-
dence that a person was, at the time a harm was suffered by another, insured wholly
or partially against loss arising from liability for that harm is inadmissible to prove
negligence or other wrongdoing." Id
161. Royal Globe, 23 Cal. 3d at 892, 592 P.2d at 338, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 851.
162. Id. at 892-94, 592 P.2d at 337, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 850 (Richardson, J., concurring
and dissenting).
163. Id. at 898, 592 P.2d at 344, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 857 (Richardson, J., concurring and
dissenting).
Suddenly, third-party claimants had "a more equal bargaining posi-
tion" in settlement negotiations and were allowed to sue the insurer
directly for bad faith practices, thus deterring violations of the Unfair
Practices Act.164 In addition, the main advantage to both insureds
and third-party claimants was the ability to bring a statutory cause of
action.165 As one author notes:
[T]he lawyer can argue that the defendant not only broke an implied promise
in the insurance policy, but also violated the law. This argument has greater
force with unsophisticated jurors who may stumble over the concept of an im-
plied promise but can easily comprehend and condemn the insurer's violation
of the law.1 6
6
Furthermore, after Royal Globe there was a tremendous surge of sug-
gested guidelines for insurers to avoid bad faith damages.167 The au-
thors did not condemn past practices, nor did they advocate public
policy reasons for suggesting new behavior.SS Instead, they were
concerned with the enormous punitive damage verdicts and their in-
creasing frequency after Royal Globe,169 which indicated that "absent
the development of the tort theory of recovery and the incidental pu-
nitive damages verdicts, it is doubtful that the claims practices of in-
surers would be any less unconscionable .... "170
IV. MORADI-SHALAL: ITS IMPACT ON BAD FAITH
LIABILITY IN CALIFORNIA
Now that a complete foundation of the applicable common law and
statutory provisions has been set, the true impact of Moradi-Shalal v.
Fireman's Fund Insurance Cos.171 overruling of Royal Globe can be
understood and appreciated. The bottom line in Moradi-Shalal is
that (1) the majority in Royal Globe "incorrectly evaluated the legis-
lative intent underlying the passage of section 790.03, subdivision
(h),"172 and (2) "[n]either section 790.03 nor section 790.09 was in-
tended to create a private civil cause of action against an insurer that
commits one of the various acts listed in [790.03(h)]."173 Therefore,
Moradi-Shalal represents the end of statutory bad faith liability in
California.174
164. Note, Extending the Liability of Insurers for Bad Faith Acts: Royal Globe In-
surance Company v. Superior Court, 7 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 777, 789-90 (1980).
165. Callahan, supra note 39, at 116-17.
166. Id. (citing ASHLEY, BAD FAITH ACTIONS--LIABILITY AND DAMAGES § 9:06
(1986)).
167. See, e.g., Karp, supra note 15, at 378-81; Rees, supra note 15, at 405-06.
168. Id. See also Levine, supra note 15, at 625-26.
169. Levine, supra note 15, at 626.
170. Id.
171. 46 Cal. 3d 287, 758 P.2d 58, 250 Cal. Rptr. 116 (1988).
172. Id. at 292, 758 P.2d at 60, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 118.
173. Id. at 304, 758 P.2d at 68, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 126.
174. See Thomas, supra note 3, at 359; see generally Bourhis, supra note 3 (discus-
sion of bad faith liability after Moradi-Shalal).
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A. Moradi-Shalal: The Decision
In Moradi-Shalal, the plaintiff had been injured in an auto acci-
dent. She subsequently brought suit against the insured for personal
injury damages, but the suit was dismissed with prejudice upon set-
tlement. Plaintiff then sued the defendant insurance company for its
alleged refusal to promptly and fairly settle her claim, in violation of
section 790.03(h)(2), (3), and (5).175 The trial court sustained the in-
surer's general demurrer since a final judgment in the underlying ac-
tion had not been reached as required under Royal Globe.176 The
court of appeal reversed and the defendant insurer brought the ac-
tion to the California Supreme Court.
The court first reviewed the majority and dissenting opinions in
Royal Globe, paying special attention to the reasoning in the dissent.
After discussing the court's ability to reexamine and reconsider prior
decisions, the court discussed the subsequent developments relating
to the Royal Globe doctrine. The court began its discussion of the
subsequent developments by noting that although similar unfair
practices acts have been adopted by forty-eight states, "the courts of
other states have largely declined to follow our Royal Globe analy-
sis."177 While noting that the opinions of other states are not control-
ling, the court stated that "the clear consensus of these out-of-state
cases strongly calls into question the validity of our statutory analysis
in Royal Globe."178
The majority then discussed the subsequent criticism of the Royal
Globe decision found in scholarly journals, noting that most "empha-
size both the erroneous nature of our holding... and the undesirable
social and economic effects of the decision .. .. ",179 Commentators
generally anticipated a rash of unwarranted claims, conflicting inter-
est between insurers and insureds, distorted bargaining strengths,
and insurers eventually passing the resulting increased costs onto
consumers. 18 0 In addition, Royal Globe was criticized by the court for
leaving many unanswered practical questions such as what consti-
tutes bad faith refusal, when an insurer's duty arises, what is the
scope of a Royal Globe action, and what are the definitions of "con-
175. Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 46 Cal. 3d 287, 293, 758 P.2d 58, 60,
250 Cal. Rptr. 116, 118 (1988).
176. Id. at 293, 758 P.2d at 60-61, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 119.
177. Id at 297, 758 P.2d at 63, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 121.
178. Id at 298, 758 P.2d at 64, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 122.
179. Id. at 299, 758 P.2d at 64, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 123.
180. See, e.g., Note, supra note 164, at 791-93.
clusion" and "pattern."' 8 ' The majority concluded that with all of
the criticism, unanswered questions, and competing policies, the reso-
lution of these issues would be best made by the legislature.18 2 The
majority then held that because of the points raised in the dissent in
Royal Globe, as' well as the subsequent developments, Royal Globe
should be overruled.1s 3
Once the majority overruled Royal Globe, they encouraged the in-
surance commissioner to administratively enforce the Unfair Prac-
tices Act, leaving available the imposition of sanctions including cease
and desist orders and fines.184 Furthermore, the majority held that
courts would retain jurisdiction over traditional common law actions
such as fraud, infliction of emotional distress, breach of contract, and
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.185 In
addition, punitive damages and prejudgment interest would be avail-
able in appropriate circumstances.1 86 The court held that Moradi-
Shalal would not apply to cases filed before the Moradi-Shalal deci-
sion became final.187
The final analysis in the majority opinion focused upon the mean-
ing of the "conclusion of an action" for those cases pending which
were not affected by Moradi-Shalal.188 The court held that: "for sur-
viving Royal Globe actions, a final judicial determination of the in-
sured's liability is a condition precedent to a section 790.03 action
against the insurer."18 9
Justice Mosk's dissent attacked the majority opinion for creating a
"Royal Bonanza" for insurance companies.190 He further condemned
the majority for its judicial activism in "totally destroying a cause of
action authorized by statute, approved by decisions of this court and
of Courts of Appeal, and acquiesced in by the Legislature for nearly a
decade."191 Next, he reiterated his analysis of the statutory cause of
action under section 790.03 which he presented when he wrote the
181. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 302-04, 758 P.2d at 68-69, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 125-26.
182. Id at 303-04, 758 P.2d at 68, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 126.
183. Id. at 304, 758 P.2d at 68, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 126.
184. Id. ("We caution, however, that our decision is not an invitation to the insur-
ance industry to commit the unfair practices proscribed by the Insurance Code. We
urge the Insurance Commissioner and the courts to continue to enforce the laws for-
bidding such practices to the full extent consistent with our opinion.") ML
185. Id. at 304-05, 758 P.2d at 68-69, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 127.
186. Id. at 305, 758 P.2d at 69, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 127.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 305-06, 758 P.2d at 69, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 127. Recall that Royal Globe re-
quired a suit between an injured party and the insured be concluded before the injured
party could file a cause of action against the insurance company for violations of sec-
tion 790.03. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
189. Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 46 Cal. 3d 287, 313, 758 P.2d 58, 75,
250 Cal. Rptr. 116, 133 (1988).
190. Id. at 313-14, 758 P.2d at 75, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 133 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
191. Id at 314, 758 P.2d at 75, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 133-34 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
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majority opinion in Royal Globe.192 Mosk further noted that in the
twenty-nine years since the Unfair Practices Act was adopted, "[o]n
not one page of one volume is a single case reported in which the In-
surance Commissioner has taken disciplinary action against [an in-
surer] for 'unfair and deceptive acts or practices' . . . involving a
claimant."193
B. Moradi-Shalal: The Future
By overruling Royal Globe, Moradi-Shalal eliminated a statutory
cause of action for unfair and deceptive insurance practices under
section 790.03 of the Insurance Code. However, the court did allow
victims of insurance abuse to recover under traditional tort theories
such as fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress, while
insureds can additionally recover for breach of contract and breach of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.194 Therefore,
aside from the loss of the trial tactic and ease of pursuing a statutory
violation,195 insureds who are able to bring a common law action for
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing will not
be as seriously affected as third-party victims. Insureds in both first-
party and third-party bad faith claims will still be able to rely on the
firmly established common law tort of bad faith.196 In addition, post-
Royal Globe decisions, which have further refined common law bad
faith standards, should still be effective in defining bad faith con-
duct.197 Furthermore, even though Moradi-Shalal held that section
790.03 does not state a private cause of action, 198 it should still be
used in common law bad faith actions to define unfair and deceptive
practices, as section 790.03 is "merely a codification of... a common-
192. Id at 314-21, 758 P.2d at 75-80, 250 Cal. Rptr. 133-38 (Mosk, J., dissenting). See
also Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 23 Cal. 3d 880, 592 P.2d 329, 153 Cal. Rptr.
842 (1979).
193. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 317, 758 P.2d at 77, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 135. See also
supra note 133 and accompanying text.
194. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 304-05, 758 P.2d at 68-69, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 127.
195. See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
196. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 304-05, 758 P.2d at 68-69, 250 Cal. Rptr. at- 127.
197. See, e.g., Congleton v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 189 Cal. App. 3d 51, 234
Cal. Rptr. 222 (1987) (interpretation of ambiguous policy and relation to bad faith);
Cal. Shoppers, Inc. v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 175 Cal. App. 3d 1, 221 Cal. Rptr. 171 (1985)
(failure to defend and relation to tort of bad faith); Delgado v. Heritage Life Ins. Co.,
157 Cal. App. 3d 262, 203 Cal. Rptr. 672 (1984) (possibility of punitive damages and bad
faith).
198. Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co., 46 Cal. 3d 287, 304, 758 P.2d
58, 68, 250 Cal. Rptr. 116, 126 (1988).
law bad faith action against an insurer .... 199
The Moradi-Shalal decision primarily will affect third-party claim-
ants by denying them a private cause of action under section 790.03.
The elimination of the statutory cause of action for bad faith leaves
third parties with their pre-Royal Globe status under Murphy v. All-
state Insurance Co.200 Therefore, because they are not parties to the
insurance contract, third parties will not be able to sue the insurer
directly for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing.201 However, under Murphy, the third party may proceed
against the insurer on an assignment of the insured's rights under
the contract.20 2 This would enable an insured who has had a judg-
ment brought against her in excess of her policy limits to assign her
cause of action against the insurance company to the third-party
judgment creditor. Unfortunately, Murphy also provides that per-
sonal claims such as personal injury and emotional damages, as well
as punitive damages, are not assignable.20 3 Therefore, in a typical ex-
cess judgment action, where the insured has suffered emotional dis-
tress as a result of the insurance company's conduct, the insured and
the third-party judgment creditor may have difficulty structuring a
proper assignment. Because some rights are assignable and others
are not, both the insured and the third party need to be careful "not
to inadvertently extinguish any rights by improperly splitting a cause
of action." 20 4 "[A]ssignments must be carefully worded to preserve
general and punitive damage rights in the insured. He or she must
then actively pursue the action, along with the third party, pursuant
to a negotiated agreement with the original plaintiff concerning dis-
position of the proceeds of any settlement or judgment." 205
Finally, when considering appropriate remedies for third-party
claimants seeking redress from the unfair and abusive practices of an
insurer, the following four remedies should be considered:
1. After judgment, a third party bodily injury or property damage claimant
still has a statutory right to collect an unsatisfied judgment, up to the policy
limits, directly from the liability insurer of the judgment debtor;
2. After judgment, a third party claimant may take an assignment of some,
but not all, of the insured's rights against the liability insurer;
3. After judgment, a third party claimant may take a lien interest against the
proceeds of the insured's suit against the defendant's liability insurer; and,
4. After an insurer's wrongful failure to defend, the insured and the claim-
ant may enter into a non-collusive settlement and enforce that settlement
199. MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 2.21, at 250-51. See supra note 125 and accompany-
ing text.
200. 17 Cal. 3d 937, 553 P.2d 584, 132 Cal. Rptr. 424 (1976). See also text accompany-
ing notes 102-114; Thomas, supra note 3, at 359-60.
201. Murphy, 17 Cal. 3d at 942-44, 553 P.2d at 587-88, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 427-28.
202. Id. at 946, 553 P.2d at 590, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 430.
203. Id.
204. Thomas, supra note 3, at 362.
205. Bourhis, supra note 3, at 367.
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against the defaulting insurer.20 6
In addition, a third party may attempt to separately sue under tort
theories such, as intentional infliction of emotional distress, conspir-
acy, invasion of privacy, fraud, or malicious prosecution. 20 7
V. CONCLUSION
By overruling Royal Globe, the multi-million dollar verdict in
Moradi-Shalal ended the statutory cause of action for bad faith liabil-
ity under section 790.03 of the Insurance Code. However, the com-
mon law doctrine of bad faith ,is still firmly established in
California.208 Insured parties are still protected from insurer bad
faith conduct as a party to the insurance contract and can bring a
cause of action against the insurance company for breach of the cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing, or bad faith.209 Unfortunately,
third-party claimants, because they are not a party to the insurance
contract, may now recover for insurer bad faith conduct only by ob-
taining an assignment from the insured; if the conduct is egregious
enough, the third party may sue under traditional tort theories.210
The court in Moradi-Shalal encouraged the insurance commis-
sioner to enforce the provisions of section 790.03. However, as com-
mentators and the dissent in Moradi-Shalal have pointed out,
enforcement will be unlikely. This lack of enforcement and loss of a
statutory bad faith cause of action were partially responsible for the
"insurance-reform stampede" in the fall of 1988.211 Both Proposi-
tions 100 and 103 would have directly affected the Moradi-Shalal
opinion. Proposition 100, if passed, would have added section 790.031
to the Insurance Code, which would have statutorily reinstated a pri-
vate cause of action under section 790.03.212 Proposition 103, which
passed but is still undergoing constitutional attacks, adds an elected
insurance commissioner to enforce the Unfair Practices Act,213 and
prohibits unfair insurance business practices under the Business and
206. Thomas, supra note 3, at 359 (emphasis added).
207. KORNBLUM, supra note 6, 3:3-4.
208. See Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 304-05, 758 P.2d at 68-69, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 127.
209. Id. at 304-05, 758 P.2d at 68-69, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 127.
210. Bhouris, supra note 3, at 365-66; see also supra notes 103-15.
211. Kushman, The Insurance.Reform Stampede, 19 CAL. J. 417 (Oct. 1988).
212. Proposition 100, § 13 "Fair Insurance Claims and Underwriting Practices."
213. Proposition 103, § 4. Elected Commissioner. "Section 12900 is added to the In-
surance Code to read: "12900. (a) The commissioner shall be elected by the People in the
same time, place and manner and for the same term as the Governor." Id.
Professions Code.214 Unfortunately, Proposition 103 does not renew
a private cause of action for bad faith insurance practices under sec-
tion 790.03.215
Independently, Moradi-Shalal's encouragement of the insurance
commissioner to enforce section 790.03 may not have generated any
pressure for the insurance commissioner to actively protect consum-
ers. However, the additional pressure surrounding the passage of
Proposition 103 and its resultant elected commissioner seems to have
put some fire under the insurance commissioner to publicly apply
pressure on the insurance companies in protecting consumers.2 16 It
appears that the political pressure on the insurance commissioner
may decrease the lack of enforcement problems which occurred
before Royal Globe.217 With an effective insurance commissioner
seeking to maintain a political career, the need for a private cause of
action under sectin 790.03 may be diminished.
However, even with an elected commissioner awakening to the
needs of insurance consumers, the State of California needs insur-
ance reform.218 This became clear in the 1988 elections when mil-
214. Proposition 103, § 3: Reduction and Control of Insurance Rates.
Article 10, commencing with Section 1861.01 is added to Chapter 9 of Part 2 of
Division 1 of the Insurance Code to read: Prohibition of Unfair Insurance
Practices: 1861.03(a) The business of insurance shall be subject to the laws of
California applicable to any other business, including, but not limited to, the
Unruh Civil Rights Act Civil Code Sections 51 through 53, and the antitrust
and unfair business practices laws (Parts 2 and 3, commencing with section
16600 of Division 7, of the Business and Professions Code)....
Id.
215. See id. If Proposition 103 withstands the constitutional attack being brought
by the insurance industry, arguments may be made that, because the new act is to be
"liberally construed and applied in order to fully promote its underlying purposes,"
the Unfair Insurance Practices section should include a private cause of action under
Insurance Code section 790.03. Id. § 8. However, this argument will probably fail be-
cause section 1861.03 seems to be concerned only with violations of the Business and
Professions Code. Id. It follows that if the writers of Proposition 103 had intended the
new act to include a private cause of action under Insurance Code section 790.03, they
would have done so expressly, as did the writers of Proposition 100:
Section 13. Fair Insurance Claims and Underwriting Practices. Section 790.031
is added to article 6.5 of. Chapter 1 of Part 2 of Division 1 of the Insurance
Code to read as follows:
790.031 Any person engaged in the business of insurance in the State of Cali-
fornia is required to act in good faith toward and to deal fairly with, current
and prospective policy holders and other persons intended to be protected by
any policy of insurance. A policyholder or a third-party may bring an action
against an insurer or licensee for violation of the provisions of this article,
including but not limited to subdivision (h) of Section 790.03.
Proposition 100, § 13.
216. Reich, State Farm to Refund New-Customer Boosts, L.A. Times, Mar. 9, 1989,
§ 1, at 1, col. 2 ("the State's largest seller of auto insurance, yielded to pressure from
Insurance Commissioner Roxani Gillespie .... ).
217. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
218. The Insurance Mess: What Now?, L.A. Times, Nov. 10, 1988, § 2 (Metro), at 6,
col 1. The editorial indicated that unfortunately "[t]he future of auto insurance in this
state depends on several officials who opposed Proposition 103, including ... [Insur-
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lions of dollars were spent trying to pass insurance-related
initiatives.2 19 The legislature needs to address the problem with re-
newed vigor, or consumers will continue to be at the mercy of the in-
surance industry. One suggestion might be the allowance of treble
damages for unfair trade practices which violate consumer protection
statutes such as section 790.03, as seen in Massachusetts, Texas, and
Washington.220 As Proposition 100 suggested, and states such as Flor-
ida have already adopted, the legislature could expressly authorize a
private cause of action for damages against an insurer who acts in bad
faith.221 Unfortunately, as one commentator has noted:
"[L]awmakers [have been] co-opted as effective peacemakers [be-
tween lawyers and insurance companies] by massive infusions of
campaign contributions from both sides; years of legislative skirmish-
ing between lawyers and insurers have been lucrative for members of
the Senate and Assembly, and a real solution would likely [anger]
both sides."222
Therefore, because of the continual leverage being applied on Cali-
fornia lawmakers by the insurance industry and lawyers, a solution
to the insurance unfair practices problem does not appear to be forth-
coming. A solution would require "legislative action," a phrase that
is almost a contradiction of terms in California and, therefore, is
unlikely.
MICHAEL J. GAINER*
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